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Code Issues Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions 8

Use Go1.11 module (#5743)

Browse source 
* Migrate to go modules

* make vendor

* Update mvdan.cc/xurls

* make vendor

* Update code.gitea.io/git

* make fmt-check

* Update github.com/go-sql-driver/mysql

* make vendor
This commit is contained in:
Mura Li 2019-03-27 19:15:23 +08:00 • committed by Lunny Xiao
parent d578b71d61
commit d77176912b
575 changed files with 63239 additions and 13963 deletions
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359
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/autocert.go generated vendored
View file

@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ var createCertRetryAfter = time.Minute
var pseudoRand *lockedMathRand
func init() {
src := mathrand.NewSource(timeNow().UnixNano())
src := mathrand.NewSource(time.Now().UnixNano())
pseudoRand = &lockedMathRand{rnd: mathrand.New(src)}
}
@ -81,9 +81,9 @@ func defaultHostPolicy(context.Context, string) error {
}
// Manager is a stateful certificate manager built on top of acme.Client.
// It obtains and refreshes certificates automatically using "tls-sni-01",
// "tls-sni-02" and "http-01" challenge types, as well as providing them
// to a TLS server via tls.Config.
// It obtains and refreshes certificates automatically using "tls-alpn-01",
// "tls-sni-01", "tls-sni-02" and "http-01" challenge types,
// as well as providing them to a TLS server via tls.Config.
//
// You must specify a cache implementation, such as DirCache,
// to reuse obtained certificates across program restarts.
@ -98,11 +98,11 @@ type Manager struct {
// To always accept the terms, the callers can use AcceptTOS.
Prompt func(tosURL string) bool
// Cache optionally stores and retrieves previously-obtained certificates.
// If nil, certs will only be cached for the lifetime of the Manager.
// Cache optionally stores and retrieves previously-obtained certificates
// and other state. If nil, certs will only be cached for the lifetime of
// the Manager. Multiple Managers can share the same Cache.
//
// Manager passes the Cache certificates data encoded in PEM, with private/public
// parts combined in a single Cache.Put call, private key first.
// Using a persistent Cache, such as DirCache, is strongly recommended.
Cache Cache
// HostPolicy controls which domains the Manager will attempt
@ -127,8 +127,10 @@ type Manager struct {
// Client is used to perform low-level operations, such as account registration
// and requesting new certificates.
//
// If Client is nil, a zero-value acme.Client is used with acme.LetsEncryptURL
// directory endpoint and a newly-generated ECDSA P-256 key.
// as directory endpoint. If the Client.Key is nil, a new ECDSA P-256 key is
// generated and, if Cache is not nil, stored in cache.
//
// Mutating the field after the first call of GetCertificate method will have no effect.
Client *acme.Client
@ -140,22 +142,30 @@ type Manager struct {
// If the Client's account key is already registered, Email is not used.
Email string
// ForceRSA makes the Manager generate certificates with 2048-bit RSA keys.
// ForceRSA used to make the Manager generate RSA certificates. It is now ignored.
//
// If false, a default is used. Currently the default
// is EC-based keys using the P-256 curve.
// Deprecated: the Manager will request the correct type of certificate based
// on what each client supports.
ForceRSA bool
// ExtraExtensions are used when generating a new CSR (Certificate Request),
// thus allowing customization of the resulting certificate.
// For instance, TLS Feature Extension (RFC 7633) can be used
// to prevent an OCSP downgrade attack.
//
// The field value is passed to crypto/x509.CreateCertificateRequest
// in the template's ExtraExtensions field as is.
ExtraExtensions []pkix.Extension
clientMu sync.Mutex
client *acme.Client // initialized by acmeClient method
stateMu sync.Mutex
state map[string]*certState // keyed by domain name
state map[certKey]*certState
// renewal tracks the set of domains currently running renewal timers.
// It is keyed by domain name.
renewalMu sync.Mutex
renewal map[string]*domainRenewal
renewal map[certKey]*domainRenewal
// tokensMu guards the rest of the fields: tryHTTP01, certTokens and httpTokens.
tokensMu sync.RWMutex
@ -167,21 +177,60 @@ type Manager struct {
// to be provisioned.
// The entries are stored for the duration of the authorization flow.
httpTokens map[string][]byte
// certTokens contains temporary certificates for tls-sni challenges
// certTokens contains temporary certificates for tls-sni and tls-alpn challenges
// and is keyed by token domain name, which matches server name of ClientHello.
// Keys always have ".acme.invalid" suffix.
// Keys always have ".acme.invalid" suffix for tls-sni. Otherwise, they are domain names
// for tls-alpn.
// The entries are stored for the duration of the authorization flow.
certTokens map[string]*tls.Certificate
// nowFunc, if not nil, returns the current time. This may be set for
// testing purposes.
nowFunc func() time.Time
}
// certKey is the key by which certificates are tracked in state, renewal and cache.
type certKey struct {
domain string // without trailing dot
isRSA bool // RSA cert for legacy clients (as opposed to default ECDSA)
isToken bool // tls-based challenge token cert; key type is undefined regardless of isRSA
}
func (c certKey) String() string {
if c.isToken {
return c.domain + "+token"
}
if c.isRSA {
return c.domain + "+rsa"
}
return c.domain
}
// TLSConfig creates a new TLS config suitable for net/http.Server servers,
// supporting HTTP/2 and the tls-alpn-01 ACME challenge type.
func (m *Manager) TLSConfig() *tls.Config {
return &tls.Config{
GetCertificate: m.GetCertificate,
NextProtos: []string{
"h2", "http/1.1", // enable HTTP/2
acme.ALPNProto, // enable tls-alpn ACME challenges
},
}
}
// GetCertificate implements the tls.Config.GetCertificate hook.
// It provides a TLS certificate for hello.ServerName host, including answering
// *.acme.invalid (TLS-SNI) challenges. All other fields of hello are ignored.
// tls-alpn-01 and *.acme.invalid (tls-sni-01 and tls-sni-02) challenges.
// All other fields of hello are ignored.
//
// If m.HostPolicy is non-nil, GetCertificate calls the policy before requesting
// a new cert. A non-nil error returned from m.HostPolicy halts TLS negotiation.
// The error is propagated back to the caller of GetCertificate and is user-visible.
// This does not affect cached certs. See HostPolicy field description for more details.
//
// If GetCertificate is used directly, instead of via Manager.TLSConfig, package users will
// also have to add acme.ALPNProto to NextProtos for tls-alpn-01, or use HTTPHandler
// for http-01. (The tls-sni-* challenges have been deprecated by popular ACME providers
// due to security issues in the ecosystem.)
func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
if m.Prompt == nil {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: Manager.Prompt not set")
@ -194,7 +243,7 @@ func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate,
if !strings.Contains(strings.Trim(name, "."), ".") {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: server name component count invalid")
}
if strings.ContainsAny(name, `/\`) {
if strings.ContainsAny(name, `+/\`) {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: server name contains invalid character")
}
@ -203,14 +252,17 @@ func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate,
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Minute)
defer cancel()
// check whether this is a token cert requested for TLS-SNI challenge
if strings.HasSuffix(name, ".acme.invalid") {
// Check whether this is a token cert requested for TLS-SNI or TLS-ALPN challenge.
if wantsTokenCert(hello) {
m.tokensMu.RLock()
defer m.tokensMu.RUnlock()
// It's ok to use the same token cert key for both tls-sni and tls-alpn
// because there's always at most 1 token cert per on-going domain authorization.
// See m.verify for details.
if cert := m.certTokens[name]; cert != nil {
return cert, nil
}
if cert, err := m.cacheGet(ctx, name); err == nil {
if cert, err := m.cacheGet(ctx, certKey{domain: name, isToken: true}); err == nil {
return cert, nil
}
// TODO: cache error results?
@ -218,8 +270,11 @@ func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate,
}
// regular domain
name = strings.TrimSuffix(name, ".") // golang.org/issue/18114
cert, err := m.cert(ctx, name)
ck := certKey{
domain: strings.TrimSuffix(name, "."), // golang.org/issue/18114
isRSA: !supportsECDSA(hello),
}
cert, err := m.cert(ctx, ck)
if err == nil {
return cert, nil
}
@ -231,14 +286,71 @@ func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate,
if err := m.hostPolicy()(ctx, name); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
cert, err = m.createCert(ctx, name)
cert, err = m.createCert(ctx, ck)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
m.cachePut(ctx, name, cert)
m.cachePut(ctx, ck, cert)
return cert, nil
}
// wantsTokenCert reports whether a TLS request with SNI is made by a CA server
// for a challenge verification.
func wantsTokenCert(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) bool {
// tls-alpn-01
if len(hello.SupportedProtos) == 1 && hello.SupportedProtos[0] == acme.ALPNProto {
return true
}
// tls-sni-xx
return strings.HasSuffix(hello.ServerName, ".acme.invalid")
}
func supportsECDSA(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) bool {
// The "signature_algorithms" extension, if present, limits the key exchange
// algorithms allowed by the cipher suites. See RFC 5246, section 7.4.1.4.1.
if hello.SignatureSchemes != nil {
ecdsaOK := false
schemeLoop:
for _, scheme := range hello.SignatureSchemes {
const tlsECDSAWithSHA1 tls.SignatureScheme = 0x0203 // constant added in Go 1.10
switch scheme {
case tlsECDSAWithSHA1, tls.ECDSAWithP256AndSHA256,
tls.ECDSAWithP384AndSHA384, tls.ECDSAWithP521AndSHA512:
ecdsaOK = true
break schemeLoop
}
}
if !ecdsaOK {
return false
}
}
if hello.SupportedCurves != nil {
ecdsaOK := false
for _, curve := range hello.SupportedCurves {
if curve == tls.CurveP256 {
ecdsaOK = true
break
}
}
if !ecdsaOK {
return false
}
}
for _, suite := range hello.CipherSuites {
switch suite {
case tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
tls.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305:
return true
}
}
return false
}
// HTTPHandler configures the Manager to provision ACME "http-01" challenge responses.
// It returns an http.Handler that responds to the challenges and must be
// running on port 80. If it receives a request that is not an ACME challenge,
@ -252,8 +364,8 @@ func (m *Manager) GetCertificate(hello *tls.ClientHelloInfo) (*tls.Certificate,
// Because the fallback handler is run with unencrypted port 80 requests,
// the fallback should not serve TLS-only requests.
//
// If HTTPHandler is never called, the Manager will only use TLS SNI
// challenges for domain verification.
// If HTTPHandler is never called, the Manager will only use the "tls-alpn-01"
// challenge for domain verification.
func (m *Manager) HTTPHandler(fallback http.Handler) http.Handler {
m.tokensMu.Lock()
defer m.tokensMu.Unlock()
@ -304,16 +416,16 @@ func stripPort(hostport string) string {
// cert returns an existing certificate either from m.state or cache.
// If a certificate is found in cache but not in m.state, the latter will be filled
// with the cached value.
func (m *Manager) cert(ctx context.Context, name string) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
func (m *Manager) cert(ctx context.Context, ck certKey) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
m.stateMu.Lock()
if s, ok := m.state[name]; ok {
if s, ok := m.state[ck]; ok {
m.stateMu.Unlock()
s.RLock()
defer s.RUnlock()
return s.tlscert()
}
defer m.stateMu.Unlock()
cert, err := m.cacheGet(ctx, name)
cert, err := m.cacheGet(ctx, ck)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -322,25 +434,25 @@ func (m *Manager) cert(ctx context.Context, name string) (*tls.Certificate, erro
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key cannot sign")
}
if m.state == nil {
m.state = make(map[string]*certState)
m.state = make(map[certKey]*certState)
}
s := &certState{
key: signer,
cert: cert.Certificate,
leaf: cert.Leaf,
}
m.state[name] = s
go m.renew(name, s.key, s.leaf.NotAfter)
m.state[ck] = s
go m.renew(ck, s.key, s.leaf.NotAfter)
return cert, nil
}
// cacheGet always returns a valid certificate, or an error otherwise.
// If a cached certficate exists but is not valid, ErrCacheMiss is returned.
func (m *Manager) cacheGet(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
// If a cached certificate exists but is not valid, ErrCacheMiss is returned.
func (m *Manager) cacheGet(ctx context.Context, ck certKey) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
if m.Cache == nil {
return nil, ErrCacheMiss
}
data, err := m.Cache.Get(ctx, domain)
data, err := m.Cache.Get(ctx, ck.String())
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -371,7 +483,7 @@ func (m *Manager) cacheGet(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*tls.Certificate
}
// verify and create TLS cert
leaf, err := validCert(domain, pubDER, privKey)
leaf, err := validCert(ck, pubDER, privKey, m.now())
if err != nil {
return nil, ErrCacheMiss
}
@ -383,7 +495,7 @@ func (m *Manager) cacheGet(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*tls.Certificate
return tlscert, nil
}
func (m *Manager) cachePut(ctx context.Context, domain string, tlscert *tls.Certificate) error {
func (m *Manager) cachePut(ctx context.Context, ck certKey, tlscert *tls.Certificate) error {
if m.Cache == nil {
return nil
}
@ -415,7 +527,7 @@ func (m *Manager) cachePut(ctx context.Context, domain string, tlscert *tls.Cert
}
}
return m.Cache.Put(ctx, domain, buf.Bytes())
return m.Cache.Put(ctx, ck.String(), buf.Bytes())
}
func encodeECDSAKey(w io.Writer, key *ecdsa.PrivateKey) error {
@ -432,9 +544,9 @@ func encodeECDSAKey(w io.Writer, key *ecdsa.PrivateKey) error {
//
// If the domain is already being verified, it waits for the existing verification to complete.
// Either way, createCert blocks for the duration of the whole process.
func (m *Manager) createCert(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
func (m *Manager) createCert(ctx context.Context, ck certKey) (*tls.Certificate, error) {
// TODO: maybe rewrite this whole piece using sync.Once
state, err := m.certState(domain)
state, err := m.certState(ck)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
@ -452,44 +564,44 @@ func (m *Manager) createCert(ctx context.Context, domain string) (*tls.Certifica
defer state.Unlock()
state.locked = false
der, leaf, err := m.authorizedCert(ctx, state.key, domain)
der, leaf, err := m.authorizedCert(ctx, state.key, ck)
if err != nil {
// Remove the failed state after some time,
// making the manager call createCert again on the following TLS hello.
time.AfterFunc(createCertRetryAfter, func() {
defer testDidRemoveState(domain)
defer testDidRemoveState(ck)
m.stateMu.Lock()
defer m.stateMu.Unlock()
// Verify the state hasn't changed and it's still invalid
// before deleting.
s, ok := m.state[domain]
s, ok := m.state[ck]
if !ok {
return
}
if _, err := validCert(domain, s.cert, s.key); err == nil {
if _, err := validCert(ck, s.cert, s.key, m.now()); err == nil {
return
}
delete(m.state, domain)
delete(m.state, ck)
})
return nil, err
}
state.cert = der
state.leaf = leaf
go m.renew(domain, state.key, state.leaf.NotAfter)
go m.renew(ck, state.key, state.leaf.NotAfter)
return state.tlscert()
}
// certState returns a new or existing certState.
// If a new certState is returned, state.exist is false and the state is locked.
// The returned error is non-nil only in the case where a new state could not be created.
func (m *Manager) certState(domain string) (*certState, error) {
func (m *Manager) certState(ck certKey) (*certState, error) {
m.stateMu.Lock()
defer m.stateMu.Unlock()
if m.state == nil {
m.state = make(map[string]*certState)
m.state = make(map[certKey]*certState)
}
// existing state
if state, ok := m.state[domain]; ok {
if state, ok := m.state[ck]; ok {
return state, nil
}
@ -498,7 +610,7 @@ func (m *Manager) certState(domain string) (*certState, error) {
err error
key crypto.Signer
)
if m.ForceRSA {
if ck.isRSA {
key, err = rsa.GenerateKey(rand.Reader, 2048)
} else {
key, err = ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
@ -512,22 +624,22 @@ func (m *Manager) certState(domain string) (*certState, error) {
locked: true,
}
state.Lock() // will be unlocked by m.certState caller
m.state[domain] = state
m.state[ck] = state
return state, nil
}
// authorizedCert starts the domain ownership verification process and requests a new cert upon success.
// The key argument is the certificate private key.
func (m *Manager) authorizedCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, domain string) (der [][]byte, leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) {
func (m *Manager) authorizedCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, ck certKey) (der [][]byte, leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) {
client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
if err := m.verify(ctx, client, domain); err != nil {
if err := m.verify(ctx, client, ck.domain); err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
csr, err := certRequest(key, domain)
csr, err := certRequest(key, ck.domain, m.ExtraExtensions)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
@ -535,25 +647,55 @@ func (m *Manager) authorizedCert(ctx context.Context, key crypto.Signer, domain
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
leaf, err = validCert(domain, der, key)
leaf, err = validCert(ck, der, key, m.now())
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, err
}
return der, leaf, nil
}
// revokePendingAuthz revokes all authorizations idenfied by the elements of uri slice.
// It ignores revocation errors.
func (m *Manager) revokePendingAuthz(ctx context.Context, uri []string) {
client, err := m.acmeClient(ctx)
if err != nil {
return
}
for _, u := range uri {
client.RevokeAuthorization(ctx, u)
}
}
// verify runs the identifier (domain) authorization flow
// using each applicable ACME challenge type.
func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string) error {
// The list of challenge types we'll try to fulfill
// in this specific order.
challengeTypes := []string{"tls-sni-02", "tls-sni-01"}
challengeTypes := []string{"tls-alpn-01", "tls-sni-02", "tls-sni-01"}
m.tokensMu.RLock()
if m.tryHTTP01 {
challengeTypes = append(challengeTypes, "http-01")
}
m.tokensMu.RUnlock()
// Keep track of pending authzs and revoke the ones that did not validate.
pendingAuthzs := make(map[string]bool)
defer func() {
var uri []string
for k, pending := range pendingAuthzs {
if pending {
uri = append(uri, k)
}
}
if len(uri) > 0 {
// Use "detached" background context.
// The revocations need not happen in the current verification flow.
go m.revokePendingAuthz(context.Background(), uri)
}
}()
// errs accumulates challenge failure errors, printed if all fail
errs := make(map[*acme.Challenge]error)
var nextTyp int // challengeType index of the next challenge type to try
for {
// Start domain authorization and get the challenge.
@ -570,6 +712,8 @@ func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string
return fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: invalid authorization %q", authz.URI)
}
pendingAuthzs[authz.URI] = true
// Pick the next preferred challenge.
var chal *acme.Challenge
for chal == nil && nextTyp < len(challengeTypes) {
@ -577,28 +721,44 @@ func (m *Manager) verify(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, domain string
nextTyp++
}
if chal == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("acme/autocert: unable to authorize %q; tried %q", domain, challengeTypes)
errorMsg := fmt.Sprintf("acme/autocert: unable to authorize %q", domain)
for chal, err := range errs {
errorMsg += fmt.Sprintf("; challenge %q failed with error: %v", chal.Type, err)
}
return errors.New(errorMsg)
}
cleanup, err := m.fulfill(ctx, client, chal)
cleanup, err := m.fulfill(ctx, client, chal, domain)
if err != nil {
errs[chal] = err
continue
}
defer cleanup()
if _, err := client.Accept(ctx, chal); err != nil {
errs[chal] = err
continue
}
// A challenge is fulfilled and accepted: wait for the CA to validate.
if _, err := client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, authz.URI); err == nil {
return nil
if _, err := client.WaitAuthorization(ctx, authz.URI); err != nil {
errs[chal] = err
continue
}
delete(pendingAuthzs, authz.URI)
return nil
}
}
// fulfill provisions a response to the challenge chal.
// The cleanup is non-nil only if provisioning succeeded.
func (m *Manager) fulfill(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, chal *acme.Challenge) (cleanup func(), err error) {
func (m *Manager) fulfill(ctx context.Context, client *acme.Client, chal *acme.Challenge, domain string) (cleanup func(), err error) {
switch chal.Type {
case "tls-alpn-01":
cert, err := client.TLSALPN01ChallengeCert(chal.Token, domain)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
m.putCertToken(ctx, domain, &cert)
return func() { go m.deleteCertToken(domain) }, nil
case "tls-sni-01":
cert, name, err := client.TLSSNI01ChallengeCert(chal.Token)
if err != nil {
@ -634,8 +794,8 @@ func pickChallenge(typ string, chal []*acme.Challenge) *acme.Challenge {
return nil
}
// putCertToken stores the cert under the named key in both m.certTokens map
// and m.Cache.
// putCertToken stores the token certificate with the specified name
// in both m.certTokens map and m.Cache.
func (m *Manager) putCertToken(ctx context.Context, name string, cert *tls.Certificate) {
m.tokensMu.Lock()
defer m.tokensMu.Unlock()
@ -643,17 +803,18 @@ func (m *Manager) putCertToken(ctx context.Context, name string, cert *tls.Certi
m.certTokens = make(map[string]*tls.Certificate)
}
m.certTokens[name] = cert
m.cachePut(ctx, name, cert)
m.cachePut(ctx, certKey{domain: name, isToken: true}, cert)
}
// deleteCertToken removes the token certificate for the specified domain name
// deleteCertToken removes the token certificate with the specified name
// from both m.certTokens map and m.Cache.
func (m *Manager) deleteCertToken(name string) {
m.tokensMu.Lock()
defer m.tokensMu.Unlock()
delete(m.certTokens, name)
if m.Cache != nil {
m.Cache.Delete(context.Background(), name)
ck := certKey{domain: name, isToken: true}
m.Cache.Delete(context.Background(), ck.String())
}
}
@ -704,7 +865,7 @@ func (m *Manager) deleteHTTPToken(tokenPath string) {
// httpTokenCacheKey returns a key at which an http-01 token value may be stored
// in the Manager's optional Cache.
func httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath string) string {
return "http-01-" + path.Base(tokenPath)
return path.Base(tokenPath) + "+http-01"
}
// renew starts a cert renewal timer loop, one per domain.
@ -715,18 +876,18 @@ func httpTokenCacheKey(tokenPath string) string {
//
// The key argument is a certificate private key.
// The exp argument is the cert expiration time (NotAfter).
func (m *Manager) renew(domain string, key crypto.Signer, exp time.Time) {
func (m *Manager) renew(ck certKey, key crypto.Signer, exp time.Time) {
m.renewalMu.Lock()
defer m.renewalMu.Unlock()
if m.renewal[domain] != nil {
if m.renewal[ck] != nil {
// another goroutine is already on it
return
}
if m.renewal == nil {
m.renewal = make(map[string]*domainRenewal)
m.renewal = make(map[certKey]*domainRenewal)
}
dr := &domainRenewal{m: m, domain: domain, key: key}
m.renewal[domain] = dr
dr := &domainRenewal{m: m, ck: ck, key: key}
m.renewal[ck] = dr
dr.start(exp)
}
@ -742,7 +903,10 @@ func (m *Manager) stopRenew() {
}
func (m *Manager) accountKey(ctx context.Context) (crypto.Signer, error) {
const keyName = "acme_account.key"
const keyName = "acme_account+key"
// Previous versions of autocert stored the value under a different key.
const legacyKeyName = "acme_account.key"
genKey := func() (*ecdsa.PrivateKey, error) {
return ecdsa.GenerateKey(elliptic.P256(), rand.Reader)
@ -753,6 +917,9 @@ func (m *Manager) accountKey(ctx context.Context) (crypto.Signer, error) {
}
data, err := m.Cache.Get(ctx, keyName)
if err == ErrCacheMiss {
data, err = m.Cache.Get(ctx, legacyKeyName)
}
if err == ErrCacheMiss {
key, err := genKey()
if err != nil {
@ -824,6 +991,13 @@ func (m *Manager) renewBefore() time.Duration {
return 720 * time.Hour // 30 days
}
func (m *Manager) now() time.Time {
if m.nowFunc != nil {
return m.nowFunc()
}
return time.Now()
}
// certState is ready when its mutex is unlocked for reading.
type certState struct {
sync.RWMutex
@ -849,12 +1023,12 @@ func (s *certState) tlscert() (*tls.Certificate, error) {
}, nil
}
// certRequest creates a certificate request for the given common name cn
// and optional SANs.
func certRequest(key crypto.Signer, cn string, san ...string) ([]byte, error) {
// certRequest generates a CSR for the given common name cn and optional SANs.
func certRequest(key crypto.Signer, cn string, ext []pkix.Extension, san ...string) ([]byte, error) {
req := &x509.CertificateRequest{
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
DNSNames: san,
Subject: pkix.Name{CommonName: cn},
DNSNames: san,
ExtraExtensions: ext,
}
return x509.CreateCertificateRequest(rand.Reader, req, key)
}
@ -885,12 +1059,12 @@ func parsePrivateKey(der []byte) (crypto.Signer, error) {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: failed to parse private key")
}
// validCert parses a cert chain provided as der argument and verifies the leaf, der[0],
// corresponds to the private key, as well as the domain match and expiration dates.
// It doesn't do any revocation checking.
// validCert parses a cert chain provided as der argument and verifies the leaf and der[0]
// correspond to the private key, the domain and key type match, and expiration dates
// are valid. It doesn't do any revocation checking.
//
// The returned value is the verified leaf cert.
func validCert(domain string, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer) (leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) {
func validCert(ck certKey, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer, now time.Time) (leaf *x509.Certificate, err error) {
// parse public part(s)
var n int
for _, b := range der {
@ -902,22 +1076,21 @@ func validCert(domain string, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer) (leaf *x509.Certi
n += copy(pub[n:], b)
}
x509Cert, err := x509.ParseCertificates(pub)
if len(x509Cert) == 0 {
if err != nil || len(x509Cert) == 0 {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: no public key found")
}
// verify the leaf is not expired and matches the domain name
leaf = x509Cert[0]
now := timeNow()
if now.Before(leaf.NotBefore) {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: certificate is not valid yet")
}
if now.After(leaf.NotAfter) {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: expired certificate")
}
if err := leaf.VerifyHostname(domain); err != nil {
if err := leaf.VerifyHostname(ck.domain); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// ensure the leaf corresponds to the private key
// ensure the leaf corresponds to the private key and matches the certKey type
switch pub := leaf.PublicKey.(type) {
case *rsa.PublicKey:
prv, ok := key.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
@ -927,6 +1100,9 @@ func validCert(domain string, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer) (leaf *x509.Certi
if pub.N.Cmp(prv.N) != 0 {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key does not match public key")
}
if !ck.isRSA && !ck.isToken {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: key type does not match expected value")
}
case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
prv, ok := key.(*ecdsa.PrivateKey)
if !ok {
@ -935,6 +1111,9 @@ func validCert(domain string, der [][]byte, key crypto.Signer) (leaf *x509.Certi
if pub.X.Cmp(prv.X) != 0 || pub.Y.Cmp(prv.Y) != 0 {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: private key does not match public key")
}
if ck.isRSA && !ck.isToken {
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: key type does not match expected value")
}
default:
return nil, errors.New("acme/autocert: unknown public key algorithm")
}
@ -955,8 +1134,6 @@ func (r *lockedMathRand) int63n(max int64) int64 {
// For easier testing.
var (
timeNow = time.Now
// Called when a state is removed.
testDidRemoveState = func(domain string) {}
testDidRemoveState = func(certKey) {}
)

6
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/cache.go generated vendored
View file

@ -16,10 +16,10 @@ import (
var ErrCacheMiss = errors.New("acme/autocert: certificate cache miss")
// Cache is used by Manager to store and retrieve previously obtained certificates
// as opaque data.
// and other account data as opaque blobs.
//
// The key argument of the methods refers to a domain name but need not be an FQDN.
// Cache implementations should not rely on the key naming pattern.
// Cache implementations should not rely on the key naming pattern. Keys can
// include any printable ASCII characters, except the following: \/:*?"<>|
type Cache interface {
// Get returns a certificate data for the specified key.
// If there's no such key, Get returns ErrCacheMiss.

7
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/listener.go generated vendored
View file

@ -72,11 +72,8 @@ func NewListener(domains ...string) net.Listener {
// the Manager m's Prompt, Cache, HostPolicy, and other desired options.
func (m *Manager) Listener() net.Listener {
ln := &listener{
m: m,
conf: &tls.Config{
GetCertificate: m.GetCertificate, // bonus: panic on nil m
NextProtos: []string{"h2", "http/1.1"}, // Enable HTTP/2
},
m: m,
conf: m.TLSConfig(),
}
ln.tcpListener, ln.tcpListenErr = net.Listen("tcp", ":443")
return ln

16
vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/acme/autocert/renewal.go generated vendored
View file

@ -17,9 +17,9 @@ const renewJitter = time.Hour
// domainRenewal tracks the state used by the periodic timers
// renewing a single domain's cert.
type domainRenewal struct {
m *Manager
domain string
key crypto.Signer
m *Manager
ck certKey
key crypto.Signer
timerMu sync.Mutex
timer *time.Timer
@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ func (dr *domainRenewal) updateState(state *certState) {
dr.m.stateMu.Lock()
defer dr.m.stateMu.Unlock()
dr.key = state.key
dr.m.state[dr.domain] = state
dr.m.state[dr.ck] = state
}
// do is similar to Manager.createCert but it doesn't lock a Manager.state item.
@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ func (dr *domainRenewal) updateState(state *certState) {
func (dr *domainRenewal) do(ctx context.Context) (time.Duration, error) {
// a race is likely unavoidable in a distributed environment
// but we try nonetheless
if tlscert, err := dr.m.cacheGet(ctx, dr.domain); err == nil {
if tlscert, err := dr.m.cacheGet(ctx, dr.ck); err == nil {
next := dr.next(tlscert.Leaf.NotAfter)
if next > dr.m.renewBefore()+renewJitter {
signer, ok := tlscert.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer)
@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ func (dr *domainRenewal) do(ctx context.Context) (time.Duration, error) {
}
}
der, leaf, err := dr.m.authorizedCert(ctx, dr.key, dr.domain)
der, leaf, err := dr.m.authorizedCert(ctx, dr.key, dr.ck)
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ func (dr *domainRenewal) do(ctx context.Context) (time.Duration, error) {
if err != nil {
return 0, err
}
if err := dr.m.cachePut(ctx, dr.domain, tlscert); err != nil {
if err := dr.m.cachePut(ctx, dr.ck, tlscert); err != nil {
return 0, err
}
dr.updateState(state)
@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ func (dr *domainRenewal) do(ctx context.Context) (time.Duration, error) {
}
func (dr *domainRenewal) next(expiry time.Time) time.Duration {
d := expiry.Sub(timeNow()) - dr.m.renewBefore()
d := expiry.Sub(dr.m.now()) - dr.m.renewBefore()
// add a bit of randomness to renew deadline
n := pseudoRand.int63n(int64(renewJitter))
d -= time.Duration(n)